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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Clayton Robert Adams appeals from the district court‟s order denying his 
motion for credit for time served on his sentence for aggravated battery. 
   
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
   
 The Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying Adams‟ 
convictions for second degree murder and aggravated battery as follows: 
 Three friends, Tyler Gorley, Stephen Maylin and Mikeal 
Campbell, were leaving a Caldwell bar at closing time when they 
ran into Adams and his friend, Sergio Madrigal, outside the 
entrance.  Campbell spoke to Adams, whom he knew, and the 
group decided to go to a private party at another location, with the 
intent to buy beer and drop off Maylin at his home along the way.  
The five men got into Adams‟ car.  According to the State‟s 
evidence at Adams‟ subsequent trial, the following events then 
unfolded.  En route, Adams asked for beer and gas money from 
Gorley, Maylin and Campbell, and when he was told that they had 
no money, Adams became enraged.  Adams told the men that he 
had a knife and a gun and that someone was going to get hurt if he 
was not given money.  In an apparent attempt to scare the men into 
compliance, Adams started driving recklessly, speeding and 
running stop lights and stop signs.  Gorley, Maylin and Campbell 
demanded to be let out of the car, but Adams initially refused to 
stop.  Eventually, Adams slammed on his brakes in the middle of a 
rural road, and the three men got out of the car to escape from him.  
Campbell was successful in doing so but the other two men were 
not.  As Maylin was exiting by the left-rear passenger door, he was 
met by Adams, who stabbed Maylin once in the side before Maylin 
got away.  Adams then stabbed Gorley five times, killing him.  
Adams then got back in his car and drove away, with Madrigal still 
a passenger.  The two men then bought beer, unsuccessfully 
looked for the party and then drove to Adams‟ home where he was 
arrested. 
 
 Adams was charged with first degree premeditated murder, 
or in the alternative, first degree felony murder, three counts of 
attempted robbery, and one count of aggravated battery.  The jury 
acquitted on the first degree murder charges and the attempted 
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robbery charges, but found Adams guilty of the lesser offense of 
second degree murder and of aggravated battery.  The district court 
imposed a unified life sentence with twenty-five years determinate 
for second degree murder and a consecutive ten-year sentence 
with three years determinate for aggravated battery. 
 
State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 859-860, 216 P.3d 146, 148-149 (Ct. App. 
2009).   
 In a later appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the proceedings 
that ensued:  
Adams filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of his 
sentences, which the district court denied.  In 2009, this Court 
affirmed Adams‟ conviction and sentences.  Adams subsequently 
filed a petition for post-conviction relief and the district court granted 
him a new sentencing hearing on the second degree murder 
charge.  At resentencing, the district court again imposed a unified 
life sentence with a twenty-five-year determinate term.  
 
(R., pp.22-23.)1  Following Adams‟ re-sentencing for second degree murder, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals again affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the 
Remittitur was entered on August 31, 2015.  (R., pp.22-24.)    
 On November 2, 2015, Adams filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served 
pursuant to Rules 35(a) and 36, I.C.R., with a supporting memorandum.  (R., 
pp.25-29.)  Adams argued that his sentences must run concurrent because:  (1) 
the original second degree murder sentence was vacated in the post-conviction 
                                            
1 On February 2, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an “Order Augmenting 
Appeal No. 42667 and Take Judicial Notice of Appeal No. 34220.”  That order 
augmented the appellate record in this case with the Clerk‟s Record, Reporter‟s 
Transcripts and Exhibits filed electronically Docket No. 42667, and took judicial 
notice of the same items filed electronically in Docket No. 34220.  (Id.)  Adams 
has also requested “this Court to take judicial notice of its file in the appeal in his 
post-conviction case, Adams v. State, S.C. Docket No. 42920[,]” which will also 
be referenced.  (Appellant‟s Brief, p.2, n.2.)  Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references to the Clerk‟s Record, Reporter‟s Transcripts and Exhibits will be to 
this appeal, Docket No. 43791.  
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proceeding, therefore, there was no contemporaneous sentence for his 
aggravated battery sentence to run consecutive to, and (2) because the district 
court did not expressly state at the re-sentencing hearing that the new sentence 
for second degree murder was consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence 
(or vice versa), the sentences could only run concurrent.  (Id.)  On November 18, 
2015, the district court entered an order denying Adams‟ motion for credit for time 
served.  (R., pp.66-67.)  Adams filed a timely notice of appeal from that order.  
(R., pp.68-69.) 
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ISSUE 
 Adams states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Adams‟ motion for credit 
for time served? 
 
(Appellant‟s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Has Adams failed to show error in the denial of his request for credit for 
time served on his sentence for aggravated battery?  
 
5 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
Adams Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Credit For 
Time Served On His Sentence For Aggravated Battery 
 
A. Introduction 
 Adams challenges the denial of his motion for credit for time served, 
arguing that he is entitled to credit on his aggravated battery sentence because it 
should run concurrent with his sentence for second degree murder.  (Appellant‟s 
Brief, pp.6-13.)  Contrary to Adams‟ assertions, he has failed to show any error in 
the denial of his motion for credit for time served. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts.”  State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The appellate courts “defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.”  
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).  
 
C. The District Court Correctly Denied Adams‟ Motion For Credit For Time 
Served On His Sentence For Aggravated Battery 
 
 On appeal, Adams specifically contends:  (1) because the original second 
degree murder sentence was vacated for re-sentencing, “[i]t could thusly not be 
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served consecutive to any other sentence, for no other sentence existed” 
(Appellant‟s Brief, p.9); (2) because, upon re-sentencing, “the district court did 
not specify whether the second degree murder sentence was to be served 
concurrently with or consecutive to any other sentence . . . [it] could only be 
concurrent” and the court‟s attempt to reaffirm the consecutive nature of the 
aggravated battery charge in the Amended Judgment and Commitment was 
ineffectual (id., pp.9-11); and (3) because a sentence cannot be partly 
consecutive and partly concurrent, he is entitled to credit for time served for 
aggravated battery since his 2007 sentencing (id., pp.11-12).  Adams‟ arguments 
fail for the following reasons.   
 Even assuming, arguendo, that Adams‟ original sentence for second 
degree murder was “vacated” by either the district court‟s oral ruling at the June 
23, 2014 summary dismissal motion hearing (see #42920 Tr., p.80, L.17 – p.85, 
L.24), or the resultant Order on Summary Dismissal (see #42920 R., Vol. 3, 
pp.1894-1895), his sentence for aggravated battery has consistently remained 
consecutive to his sentence for second degree murder.2    
 Adams‟ original Judgment and Commitment reads in relevant part: 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be sentenced on Count I,[3] to 
the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a minimum 
period of confinement of twenty five (25) years, and a subsequent 
indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed life, for a total 
aggregate term of life, and the defendant be sentenced on Count II, 
                                            
2  There is no indication in the record that the court “vacated” Adams‟ sentence 
for second degree murder, vis-à-vis, ordered re-sentencing.  (See R., pp.36-62; 
#42920 R., Vol. 3, pp.1669-1673, 1894-1895, 1933; #42920 6/23/14 Tr.)  
 
3  Count I is second degree murder and Count II is aggravated battery.  (R., 
pp.33-34.)  
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to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a 
minimum period of confinement of three (3) years, and a 
subsequent indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed 
seven (7) years, for a total aggregate term of ten (10) years, with 
said sentences to run consecutively. 
 
(R., pp.33-34 (emphasis added).)  The district court could not have stated its 
intent any more clearly -- “said sentences to run consecutively.”  (Id.)   
 At the October 15, 2014 re-sentencing hearing, the district court gave 
Adams the same sentence it originally ordered -- unified life with 25 years fixed.  
(R., pp.31-32 (Amended Judgment and Commitment), 62 (re-sentencing hearing 
transcript).)  The Amended Judgment and Commitment also stated: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence previously imposed 
on May 8, 2007, with regards to the charge of Aggravated Battery 
in Count II, and as set forth in the Judgment and Commitment filed 
May 15, 2007, shall remain as reflected in said judgment. 
 
(R., p.32 (emphasis added).)  Inasmuch as the 2007 Judgment and Commitment 
reflects that the two sentences were ordered “to run consecutively” to each other 
(R., pp.33-34), the court‟s 2014 Amended Judgment and Commitment reaffirmed 
that the aggravated battery sentence was to run consecutive to the second 
degree murder sentence.  Adams‟ aggravated battery sentence has consistently 
been ordered to run consecutive to his second degree murder sentence.         
 Nonetheless, Adams argues, “once the second degree murder charge 
[sic][4] was vacated, the aggravated battery was consecutive to nothing . . . [and 
because] [i]t was therefore no longer a consecutive sentence, it was 
                                            
4  The second degree murder charge was never vacated.  The district court 
ordered that Adams be re-sentenced on his conviction for second degree 
murder.   
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concurrent.”5  (Appellant‟s Brief, p.11 (emphasis added).)  Adams‟ assertion that 
once his sentence for second degree murder was (arguably) vacated, his 
aggravated battery sentence was “consecutive to nothing,” is incorrect.     
 Idaho Code § 18-308 states:   
Successive terms of imprisonment. -- When any person is 
convicted of two (2) or more crimes before sentence has been 
pronounced upon him for either, the imprisonment to which he is 
sentenced upon the second or other subsequent conviction, in the 
discretion of the court, may commence at the termination of the first 
term of imprisonment to which he shall be adjudged, or at the 
termination of the second or other subsequent term of 
imprisonment, as the case may be. 
 
Adams‟ argument that, after his second degree murder sentence was vacated, 
there was nothing for his aggravated battery sentence to run concurrent to, is 
erroneous.  Under I.C. § 18-308, the district court had discretion, after Adams 
was convicted of his crimes, to order either (of both) of the sentences to run 
consecutive with the other.  Adams did not have to be sentenced for second 
degree murder – only convicted of that crime -- in order for his aggravated 
battery sentence to run consecutive to it.  Because I.C § 18-308 gave the district 
court such discretion, Adams‟ argument must be rejected.  
 Adams further asserts, “[w]here the district court did not specify that the 
second degree murder was consecutive to the aggravated battery the oral 
pronouncement controls, and the sentences are concurrent.”  (Appellant‟s Brief, 
p.11.)  Adams‟ focus on the district court‟s silence about whether his second 
degree murder sentence ran consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence is 
                                            
5  Logically, if there was no sentence for his aggravated battery sentence to run 
consecutive to, there likewise was no sentence for it to run concurrent with.    
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misplaced.  The issue is whether his aggravated battery sentence had been 
changed (from consecutive) to run concurrent with his second degree murder 
sentence.  As previously shown, the “consecutive” nature of Adams‟ aggravated 
battery sentence has steadfastly remained intact.  It is irrelevant that the district 
court did not orally order, during the re-sentencing hearing, that the sentence for 
second degree murder would run consecutive to the aggravated battery 
sentence.   
 Adams next contends that the court‟s statement in the Amended 
Judgment and Commitment -- that the 2007 sentence for aggravated battery 
“shall remain as reflected in said judgment” -- was “ineffective.”6  (Appellant‟s 
Brief, p.10.)  He argues that, because “the oral pronouncement controls . . . any 
attempt to modify the sentences by correcting or altering the sentences in a 
written order was invalid[.]”  (Id.)  Obviously, the “oral pronouncement” priority 
rule pertains to the sentence that is in question.  Here, employing that rule makes 
no sense because the court re-sentenced Adams for second degree murder, not 
aggravated battery.  Moreover, the court‟s statement that the 2007 aggravated 
battery sentence “shall remain as reflected in said judgment” (R., p.32) cannot in 
any way be deemed an attempt to modify or alter the 2007 sentence – it is just 
the opposite.    
                                            
6   The second reason Adams gives for labeling the district court‟s statement as 
“ineffective” is that it “was required to make the later-imposed sentence (the 
second degree murder) consecutive to the sentence imposed first (the 
aggravated battery) once the sentence was orally pronounced on the defendant.”  
(Appellant‟s Brief, p.10.)  As discussed, that argument is irrelevant to the 
question of whether Adams‟ aggravated battery sentence runs consecutive to his 
second degree murder sentence.     
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 Finally, Adams argues that he “is entitled to credit for time served on the 
aggravated battery since his 2007 sentencing.”  (Appellant‟s Brief, pp.11-13.)  
This argument fails because it relies on his assertion that his aggravated battery 
sentence was rendered “concurrent” in 2007 when the post-conviction court 
granted him a re-sentencing hearing on second degree murder, thus (he argues) 
making his aggravated battery sentence concurrent.  As shown above, Adams‟ 
“concurrent sentence” argument does not hold true.  As a result, Adams‟ 
argument that his aggravated battery sentence began to run concurrently with his 
second degree murder sentence in 2007 because „“[a] singular sentence simply 
cannot be partially concurrent and partially consecutive to another sentence” (id., 
p.11 (quoting Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 355, 955 P.2d 
1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1998)), is untenable, and must also be rejected.      
 In sum, the district court correctly determined that Adams was not entitled 
to credit for time served on his aggravated battery sentence because it was 
consistently ordered to run consecutive to his sentence for second degree 
murder.  That Adams was re-sentenced for second degree murder did nothing to 
change the consecutive nature of his aggravated battery sentence.  Adams has 
failed to show any basis for reversal.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court‟s 
order denying Adams‟ motion for credit for time served. 
  DATED this 14th day of September, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ John C. McKinney_______ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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